German nuclear energy project
The
German nuclear energy project (
German:
Uranprojekt; informally known as the
Uranverein;
English:
Uranium Club), was an attempted clandestine scientific effort led by
Germany to develop and produce
atomic weapons during the events of
World War II. This program started in April 1939, just months after the discovery of
nuclear fission in January 1939, but ended only months later, due to
German invasion of
Poland, where many notable physicists were drafted into the
Wehrmacht. However, the second effort began under the administrative auspices of the
Wehrmacht's Heereswaffenamt on the day World War II began (1 September 1939). The program eventually expanded into three main efforts: the
Uranmaschine (
nuclear reactor), uranium and
heavy water production, and uranium
isotope separation.
Eventually it was assessed that nuclear fission would not contribute
significantly to ending the war, and in January 1942, the
Heereswaffenamt
turned the program over to the Reich Research Council while continuing
to fund the program. At this time, the program split up between nine
major institutes where the directors dominated the research and set
their own objectives. At that time, the number of scientists working on
applied nuclear fission began to diminish, with many applying their
talents to more pressing war-time demands.
The most influential people in the
Uranverein were
Kurt Diebner,
Abraham Esau,
Walther Gerlach, and
Erich Schumann;
Schumann was one of the most powerful and influential physicists in
Germany. Diebner, throughout the life of the nuclear energy project, had
more control over nuclear fission research than did
Walther Bothe,
Klaus Clusius,
Otto Hahn,
Paul Harteck, or
Werner Heisenberg.
Abraham Esau was appointed as Hermann Göring's plenipotentiary for
nuclear physics research in December 1942; Walther Gerlach succeeded him
in December 1943.
Politicization of the German
academia under the
National Socialist
regime had driven many physicists, engineers, and mathematicians out of
Germany as early as 1933. Those of Jewish heritage who did not leave
were quickly purged from German institutions, further thinning the ranks
of academia. The politicization of the universities, along with the
demands for manpower by the German armed forces (many scientists and
technical personnel were conscripted, despite possessing useful skills),
would eventually all but eliminate a generation of physicists.
[1]
At the end of the war, the Allied powers competed to obtain surviving
components of the nuclear industry (personnel, facilities, and
materiel), as they did with the
V-2 program.
Discovery of nuclear fission
In December 1938, the German chemists
Otto Hahn and
Fritz Strassmann sent a manuscript to the science journal
Naturwissenschaften ("Natural Science") reporting they had detected the element
barium after bombarding
uranium with
neutrons;
[2] simultaneously, they communicated these results to
Lise Meitner, who had in July of that year fled to the
Netherlands and then went to
Sweden.
[3] Meitner, and her nephew
Otto Robert Frisch, correctly interpreted these results as being
nuclear fission.
[4] Frisch confirmed this experimentally on 13 January 1939.
[5][6]
First Uranverein
Paul Harteck was director of the physical chemistry department at the
University of Hamburg and an advisor to the
Heereswaffenamt (HWA, Army Ordnance Office). On 24 April 1939, along with his teaching assistant
Wilhelm Groth, Harteck made contact with the
Reichskriegsministerium
(RKM, Reich Ministry of War) to alert them to the potential of military
applications of nuclear chain reactions. Two days earlier, on 22 April
1939, after hearing a colloquium paper by
Wilhelm Hanle on the use of
uranium fission in a
Uranmaschine (uranium machine, i.e.,
nuclear reactor),
Georg Joos, along with Hanle, notified Wilhelm Dames, at the
Reichserziehungsministerium (REM, Reich Ministry of Education), of potential military applications of nuclear energy. The communication was given to
Abraham Esau, head of the physics section of the
Reichsforschungsrat (RFR, Reich Research Council) at the REM's undersecretary
Rudolf Mentzel. On 29 April, a group, organized by Esau, met with
Rudolf Mentzel at the REM to discuss the potential of a sustained
nuclear chain reaction. The group included the physicists
Walther Bothe,
Robert Döpel,
Hans Geiger,
Wolfgang Gentner (probably sent by
Walther Bothe),
Wilhelm Hanle,
Gerhard Hoffmann, and
Georg Joos;
Peter Debye was invited, but he did not attend. After this, informal work began at the
Georg-August University of Göttingen by Joos, Hanle, and their colleague
Reinhold Mannkopff; the group of physicists was known informally as the first
Uranverein (Uranium Club) and formally as
Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kernphysik. The group's work was discontinued in August 1939, when the three were called to military training.
[7][8][9][10]
Another notification
The industrial firm
Auergesellschaft had a substantial amount of "waste"
uranium from which it had extracted
radium. After reading a June 1939 paper by
Siegfried Flügge, on the technical use of nuclear energy from uranium,
[11][12] Riehl recognized a business opportunity for the company, and in July he went to the HWA (
Heereswaffenamt,
Army Ordnance Office) to discuss the production of uranium. The HWA was
interested and Riehl committed corporate resources to the task. The HWA
eventually provided an order for the production of uranium oxide, which
took place in the Auergesellschaft plant in
Oranienburg, north of Berlin.
[13][14]
Second Uranverein
The second
Uranverein began after the
Heereswaffenamt (HWA, Army Ordinance Office) squeezed out the
Reichsforschungsrat (RFR, Reich Research Council) of the
Reichserziehungsministerium (REM, Reich Ministry of Education) and started the formal German nuclear energy project under military auspices. The second
Uranverein
was formed on 1 September 1939, the day World War II began, and it had
its first meeting on 16 September 1939. The meeting was organized by
Kurt Diebner, advisor to the HWA, and held in Berlin. The invitees included
Walther Bothe,
Siegfried Flügge,
Hans Geiger,
Otto Hahn,
Paul Harteck,
Gerhard Hoffmann,
Josef Mattauch, and
Georg Stetter. A second meeting was held soon thereafter and included
Klaus Clusius,
Robert Döpel,
Werner Heisenberg, and
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. Also at this time, the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für Physik (KWIP, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics, after World War II the
Max Planck Institute for Physics), in
Berlin-Dahlem,
was placed under HWA authority, with Diebner as the administrative
director, and the military control of the nuclear research commenced.
[9][10][15]
When it was apparent that the nuclear energy project would not make a
decisive contribution to ending the war in the near term, control of
the KWIP was returned in January 1942 to its umbrella organization, the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft (KWG, Kaiser Wilhelm Society, after World War II the
Max-Planck Gesellschaft),
and HWA control of the project was relinquished to the RFR in July
1942. The nuclear energy project thereafter maintained its
kriegswichtig
(important for the war) designation and funding continued from the
military. However, the German nuclear power project was then broken down
into the following main areas:
uranium and
heavy water production, uranium isotope separation, and the
Uranmaschine
(uranium machine, i.e., nuclear reactor). Also, the project was then
essentially split up between a number of institutes, where the directors
dominated the research and set their own research agendas.
[9][16][17] The dominant personnel, facilities, and areas of research were:
[18][19][20]
- Walther Bothe — Director of the Institut für Physik (Institute for Physics) at the Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für medizinische Forschung (KWImF, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research, after 1948 the Max-Planck-Institut für medizinische Forschung), in Heidelberg.
- Measurement of nuclear constants. (6 physicists)
- Klaus Clusius — Director of the Institute for Physical Chemistry at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
- Kurt Diebner — Director of the HWA Versuchsstelle (testing station) in Gottow; Diebner, was also director the RFR experimental station in Stadtilm, Thuringia. He was also an advisor to the HWA on nuclear physics.
- Measurement of nuclear constants. (ca. 6 physicists)
- Otto Hahn — Director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Chemie (KWIC, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry, after World War II the Max Planck Institut für Chemie — Otto Hahn Institut), in Berlin-Dahlem.
- Transuranic elements, fission products, isotope separation, and measurement of nuclear constants. (ca. 6 chemists and physicists)
- Paul Harteck — Director of the Physical Chemistry Department of the University of Hamburg.
- Heavy water production and isotope production. (5 physical chemists, physicists, and chemists)
- Werner Heisenberg — Director of the Department of Theoretical Physics at the University of Leipzig until summer 1942. Thereafter acting director of the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Physik (Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics), in Berlin-Dahlem.
- Uranmaschine, isotope separation, and measurement of nuclear constants. (ca. 7 physicists and physical chemists).
- Hans Kopfermann — Director of the Second Experimental Physics Institute at the Georg-August University of Göttingen.
- Isotope separation. (2 physicists)
- Nikolaus Riehl — Scientific Director of the Auergesellschaft.
- Uranium production. (ca. 3 physicists and physical chemists)
- Georg Stetter — Director of the II. Physikalisches Institut (Second Physics Institute) at the University of Vienna.
- Transuranic elements and measurement of nuclear constants. (ca. 6 physicists and physical chemists)
The point in 1942, when the army relinquished its control of the
German nuclear energy project, was the zenith of the project relative to
the number of personnel devoted to the effort. There were only about
seventy scientists working on the project, with about forty devoting
more than half their time to nuclear fission research. After this, the
number of scientists working on applied nuclear fission diminished
dramatically. Many of the scientists not working with the main
institutes stopped working on nuclear fission and devoted their efforts
to more pressing war related work.
[21]
On 4 June 1942, a conference initiated by the "Reich Minister for Armament and Ammunition"
Albert Speer regarding the nuclear energy project, had decided its continuation merely for the aim of energy production.
[22] On 9 June 1942,
Adolf Hitler issued a decree for the reorganization of the RFR as a separate legal entity under the
Reichsministerium für Bewaffnung und Munition
(RMBM, Reich Ministry for Armament and Ammunition, after autumn 1943
the Reich Ministry for Armament and War Production); the decree
appointed Reich Marshal
Hermann Göring as the president.
[23] The reorganization was done under the initiative of Minister
Albert Speer of the RMBM; it was necessary as the RFR under Minister Bernhard Rust was ineffective and not achieving its purpose.
[24]
It was the hope that Göring would manage the RFR with the same
discipline and efficiency as he had in the aviation sector. A meeting
was held on 6 July 1942 to discuss the function of the RFR and set its
agenda. The meeting was a turning point in National Socialism's attitude
towards science, as well as recognition that its policies which drove
Jewish scientists out of Germany were a mistake, as the Reich needed
their expertise.
Abraham Esau was appointed on 8 December 1942 as
Hermann Göring's Bevollmächtigter (plenipotentiary) for nuclear physics research under the RFR; in December 1943, Esau was replaced by
Walther Gerlach.
In the final analysis, placing the RFR under Göring's administrative
control had little effect on the German nuclear energy project.
[25][26][27][28]
Over time, the HWA and then the RFR controlled the German nuclear energy project. The most influential people were
Kurt Diebner,
Abraham Esau,
Walther Gerlach, and
Erich Schumann.
Schumann was one of the most powerful and influential physicists in
Germany. Schumann was director of the Physics Department II at the
Frederick William University (later, University of Berlin), which was
commissioned and funded by the
Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH, Army
High Command) to conduct physics research projects. He was also head of
the research department of the HWA, assistant secretary of the Science
Department of the OKW, and
Bevollmächtigter (plenipotentiary) for
high explosives. Diebner, throughout the life of the nuclear energy
project, had more control over nuclear fission research than did
Walther Bothe,
Klaus Clusius,
Otto Hahn,
Paul Harteck, or
Werner Heisenberg.
[29][30]
Isotope separation
Heinz Ewald, a member of the
Uranverein, had proposed an electromagnetic isotope separator, which was thought applicable to U
235 production and enrichment. This was picked up by
Manfred von Ardenne, who ran a private research establishment.
In 1928, von Ardenne had come into his inheritance with full control
as to how it could be spent, and he established his private research
laboratory the
Forschungslaboratoriums für Elektronenphysik,
[31] in Berlin-Lichterfelde, to conduct his own research on radio and television technology and
electron microscopy.
He financed the laboratory with income he received from his inventions
and from contracts with other concerns. For example, his research on
nuclear physics and high-frequency technology was financed by the
Reichspostministerium (RPM, Reich Postal Ministry), headed by
Wilhelm Ohnesorge. Von Ardenne attracted top-notch personnel to work in his facility, such as the nuclear physicist
Fritz Houtermans, in 1940.
Von Ardenne had also conducted research on isotope separation.
[32][33]
Taking Ewald's suggestion he began building a prototype for the RPM.
The work was hampered by war shortages and ultimately ended by the war.
[34]
Internal reports
Reports from the research conducted were published in
Kernphysikalische Forschungsberichte (
Research Reports in Nuclear Physics), an internal publication of the
Uranverein.
The reports were classified Top Secret, they had very limited
distribution, and the authors were not allowed to keep copies. The
reports were confiscated under the Allied
Operation Alsos and sent to the
United States Atomic Energy Commission for evaluation. In 1971, the reports were declassified and returned to Germany. The reports are available at the
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center and the
American Institute of Physics.
[35][36]
Individual reports are cited on the pages for some of the research participants in the
Uranverein; see for example
Friedrich Bopp,
Kurt Diebner,
Klara Döpel,
Robert Döpel,
Siegfried Flügge,
Paul Harteck,
Walter Herrmann,
Karl-Heinz Höcker,
Fritz Houtermans,
Horst Korsching,
Georg Joos,
Heinz Pose,
Carl Ramsauer,
Fritz Strassmann,
Karl Wirtz, and
Karl Zimmer.
Politicisation
Two factors which had deleterious effects on the nuclear energy
project were the politicisation of the education system under National
Socialism and the rise of the
Deutsche Physik movement, which was
anti-Semitic and had a bias against
theoretical physics, especially including
quantum mechanics.
[37]
Emigrations
Adolf Hitler took power on 30 January 1933. On 7 April, the
Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service
was enacted; this law, and its subsequent related ordinances,
politicized the education system in Germany. This had immediate
deleterious effects on the physics capabilities of Germany. Furthermore,
combined with the
deutsche Physik movement, the deleterious
effects were intensified and prolonged. The consequences to physics in
Germany and its subfield of nuclear physics were multifaceted.
An immediate consequence upon passage of the law was that it produced
both quantitative and qualitative losses to the physics community.
Numerically, it has been estimated that a total of 1,145 university
teachers, in all fields, were driven from their posts, which represented
about 14% of the higher learning institutional staff members in
1932–1933.
[38] Out of 26 German nuclear physicists cited in the literature before 1933, 50% emigrated.
[39]
Qualitatively, 10 physicists and four chemists who had won or would win
the Nobel Prize emigrated from Germany shortly after Hitler came to
power, most of them in 1933.
[40] These 14 scientists were:
Hans Bethe,
Felix Bloch,
Max Born,
Albert Einstein,
James Franck,
Peter Debye,
Dennis Gabor,
Fritz Haber,
Gerhard Herzberg,
Victor Hess,
George de Hevesy,
Erwin Schrödinger,
Otto Stern, and
Eugene Wigner. Britain and the USA were often the recipients of the talent which left Germany.
[41] The
University of Göttingen had 45 dismissals from the staff of 1932–1933, for a loss of 19%.
[38] Eight students, assistants, and colleagues of the Göttingen theoretical physicist
Max Born left Europe after Hitler came to power and eventually found work on the
Manhattan Project, thus helping the United States, Britain and Canada to develop the atomic bomb; they were
Enrico Fermi,
[42] James Franck,
Maria Goeppert-Mayer,
Robert Oppenheimer,
Edward Teller,
Victor Weisskopf,
Eugene Wigner, and
John von Neumann.
[43] Otto Robert Frisch, who with
Rudolf Peierls first calculated the critical mass of U-235 needed for an explosive, was also a Jewish refugee.
Max Planck, the father of
quantum theory, had been right in assessing the consequences of National Socialist policies. In 1933, Planck, as president of the
Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Society), met with
Adolf Hitler.
During the meeting, Planck told Hitler that forcing Jewish scientists
to emigrate would mutilate Germany and the benefits of their work would
go to foreign countries. Hitler responded with a rant against Jews and
Planck could only remain silent and then take his leave. The National
Socialist regime would only come around to the same conclusion as Planck
in the 6 July 1942 meeting regarding the future agenda of the
Reichsforschungsrat (RFR, Reich Research Council), but by then it was too late.
[25][44]
Heisenberg affair
The politicisation of the education system essentially replaced
academic tradition and excellence with ideological adherence and
trappings, such as membership in National Socialist organisations, such
as the
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP, National Socialist German Workers Party), the
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Dozentenbund (NSDDB, National Socialist German University Lecturers League), and the
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund
(NSDStB, National Socialist German Student League). The politicization
can be illustrated with the conflict which evolved when a replacement
for
Arnold Sommerfeld was sought in view of his emeritus status. The conflict involved one of the prominent
Uranverein participants, Werner Heisenberg.
On 1 April 1935
Arnold Sommerfeld, Heisenberg's teacher and doctoral advisor at the
University of Munich,
achieved emeritus status. However, Sommerfeld stayed on as his own
temporary replacement during the selection process for his successor,
which took until 1 December 1939. The process was lengthy due to
academic and political differences between the Munich Faculty's
selection and that of both the
Reichserziehungsministerium (REM, Reich Education Ministry) and the supporters of
Deutsche Physik.
In 1935, the Munich Faculty drew up a candidate list to replace
Sommerfeld as ordinarius professor of theoretical physics and head of
the Institute for Theoretical Physics at the University of Munich. There
were three names on the list:
Werner Heisenberg, who received the
Nobel Prize in Physics in 1932,
Peter Debye, who would receive the
Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1936, and
Richard Becker —
all former students of Sommerfeld. The Munich Faculty was firmly behind
these candidates, with Heisenberg as their first choice. However,
supporters of
Deutsche Physik and elements in the REM had their
own list of candidates and the battle commenced, dragging on for over
four years. During this time, Heisenberg came under vicious attack by
the supporters of
deutsche Physik. One such attack was published in
Das Schwarze Korps, the newspaper of the
Schutzstaffel, or SS, headed by
Heinrich Himmler. In the editorial, Heisenberg was called a "White Jew" who should be made to "disappear."
[45]
These verbal attacks were taken seriously, as Jews were subject to
physical violence and incarceration at the time. Heisenberg fought back
with an editorial and a letter to Himmler, in an attempt to get a
resolution to this matter and regain his honor. At one point,
Heisenberg's mother visited Himmler's mother to help bring a resolution
to the affair. The two women knew each other as a result of Heisenberg's
maternal grandfather and Himmler's father being rectors and members of a
Bavarian hiking club. Eventually, Himmler settled the Heisenberg affair
by sending two letters, one to
SS-Gruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich
and one to Heisenberg, both on 21 July 1938. In the letter to Heydrich,
Himmler said Germany could not afford to lose or silence Heisenberg as
he would be useful for teaching a generation of scientists. To
Heisenberg, Himmler said the letter came on recommendation of his family
and he cautioned Heisenberg to make a distinction between professional
physics research results and the personal and political attitudes of the
involved scientists. The letter to Heisenberg was signed under the
closing "
Mit freundlichem Gruss und, Heil Hitler!" ("With friendly greetings, Heil Hitler!")
[46]
Overall, the settlement of the Heisenberg affair was a victory for
academic standards and professionalism. However, the replacement of
Sommerfeld by Wilhelm Müller on 1 December 1939 was a victory of
politics over academic standards. Müller was not a theoretical
physicist, had not published in a physics journal, and was not a member
of the
Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
(DPG, German Physical Society); his appointment as a replacement for
Sommerfeld was considered a travesty and detrimental to educating a new
generation of theoretical physicists.
[46][47][48][49][50]
Missing generation of physicists
Politicization of the academic community, combined with the impact of the
deutsche Physik movement and other policies, such as drafting physicists to fight in the war (e.g.,
Paul O. Müller, a member of the
Uranverein who was killed at the
Russian front),
had the net effect of bringing about a missing generation of
physicists. At the close of the war, physicists born between 1915 and
1925 were almost nonexistent.
[51]
Autonomy and accommodation
Members of the
Uranverein,
Wolfgang Finkelnburg,
Werner Heisenberg,
Carl Ramsauer, and
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker were effective in countering the politicisation of academia and effectively putting an end to the influence of the
deutsche Physik movement. However, in order to do this they were, as were many scientists, caught between autonomy and accommodation.
[52] Essentially, they would have to legitimize the National Socialist system by compromise and collaboration.
[53]
During the period in which
Deutsche Physik was gaining
prominence, a foremost concern of the great majority of scientists was
to maintain autonomy against political encroachment.
[54] Some of the more established scientists, such as
Max von Laue, could demonstrate more autonomy than the younger and less established scientists.
[55] This was, in part, due to political organizations, such as the
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Dozentenbund (National Socialist German University Lecturers League), whose district leaders had a decisive role in the acceptance of an
Habilitationsschrift, which was a prerequisite to attaining the rank of
Privatdozent necessary to becoming a university lecturer.
[56]
While some with ability joined such organizations out of tactical
career considerations, others with ability and adherence to historical
academic standards joined these organizations to moderate their
activities. This was the case of Finkelnburg.
[57][58] It was in the summer of 1940 that Finkelnburg became an acting director of the NSDDB at
Technische Hochschule, Darmstadt.
[59] As such, he organized the
Münchner Religionsgespräche, which took place on 15 November 1940 and was known as the
Munich Synod . The
Münchner Religionsgespräche was an offensive against
deutsche Physik.
[60] While the technical outcome may have been thin, it was a political victory against
deutsche Physik.
[57] Also, in part, it was Finkelnburg's role in organising this event that influenced
Carl Ramsauer, as president of the
Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft, to select Finkelnburg in 1941 as his deputy.
[61] Finkelnburg served in this capacity until the end of World War II.
Early in 1942, as president of the DPG, Ramsauer, on
Felix Klein's initiative and with the support of
Ludwig Prandtl, submitted a petition to Reich Minister
Bernhard Rust, at the
Reichserziehungsministerium (Reich Education Ministry). The petition, a letter and six attachments,
[62]
addressed the atrocious state of physics instruction in Germany, which
Ramsauer concluded was the result of politicization of education.
[63]
Exploitation and denial
Near the end of World War II, the principal Allied war powers made
plans for exploitation of German science. In light of the implications
of nuclear weapons, German nuclear fission and related technologies were
singled out for special attention. In addition to exploitations, denial
was an element of their efforts, i.e., the Americans and Russians
conducted their respective operations to try to deny German technology,
personnel, and material to the other party. Application of denial often
meant getting there first, which to some extent put the Russians at a
disadvantage in some geographic locations, even if the area was to be in
the Russian zone of occupation. When it came to applications of
exploitation and denial, all parties were sometimes heavy-handed.
[64][65][66][67][68]
A general US denial and exploitation effort was
Operation Paperclip. Operations directed specifically towards German nuclear fission were
Operation Alsos and
Operation Epsilon,
the latter being done in collaboration with the British. In lieu of the
codename for the Russian operation, if it had one, it has been referred
to by Oleynikov as the
Russian "Alsos".
[69]
American and British
Berlin had been a location of many German scientific research
facilities. To limit casualties and loss of equipment, many of these
facilities were dispersed to other locations in the latter years of the
war.
Unfortunately for the Russians, the
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Physik (KWIP, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics) had mostly been moved in 1943 and 1944 to
Hechingen and its neighboring town of
Haigerloch, on the edge of the
Black Forest,
which eventually became the French occupation zone. This move allowed
the Americans to take into custody a large number of German scientists
associated with nuclear research. The only section of the institute
which remained in Berlin was the low-temperature physics section, headed
by Ludwig Bewilogua, who was in charge of the exponential uranium pile.
[70][71]
Nine of the prominent German scientists who published reports in
Kernphysikalische Forschungsberichte as members of the
Uranverein[72] were picked up by
Operation Alsos and incarcerated in England under
Operation Epsilon:
Erich Bagge,
Kurt Diebner,
Walther Gerlach,
Otto Hahn,
Paul Harteck,
Werner Heisenberg,
Horst Korsching,
Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, and
Karl Wirtz. Also, incarcerated was
Max von Laue,
although he had nothing to do with the nuclear energy project.
Goudsmit, the chief scientific advisor to Operation Alsos, thought von
Laue might be beneficial to the postwar rebuilding of Germany and would
benefit from the high level contacts he would have in England.
[73]
- Oranienburg Plant
With the interest of the
Heereswaffenamt (HWA, Army Ordnance Office),
Nikolaus Riehl, and his colleague
Günter Wirths, set up an industrial-scale production of high-purity uranium oxide at the
Auergesellschaft plant in
Oranienburg.
Adding to the capabilities in the final stages of metallic uranium
production were the strength's of the Degussa corporation's capabilities
in metals production.
[74][75]
The Oranienburg plant provided the uranium sheets and cubes for the
Uranmaschine experiments conducted at the KWIP and the
Versuchsstelle (testing station) of the
Heereswaffenamt (Army Ordnance Office) in Gottow. The G-1 experiment
[76] performed at the HWA testing station, under the direction of
Kurt Diebner, had lattices of 6,800 uranium oxide cubes (about 25 tons), in the nuclear moderator paraffin.
[14][77]
Work of the American Operation Alsos teams, in November 1944,
uncovered leads which took them to a company in Paris that handled rare
earths and had been taken over by the
Auergesellschaft. This, combined with information gathered in the same month through an Alsos team in
Strasbourg,
confirmed that the Oranienburg plant was involved in the production of
uranium and thorium metals. Since the plant was to be in the future
Soviet zone of occupation and the Russian troops would get there before
the Allies, General
Leslie Groves, commander of the
Manhattan Project, recommended to General
George Marshall
that the plant be destroyed by aerial bombardment, in order to deny its
uranium production equipment to the Russians. On 15 March 1945, 612
B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the
Eighth Air Force
dropped 1,506 tons of high-explosive and 178 tons of incendiary bombs
on the plant. Riehl visited the site with the Russians and said that the
facility was mostly destroyed. Riehl also recalled long after the war
that the Russians knew precisely why the Americans had bombed the
facility — the attack had been directed at them rather than the Germans.
[78][79][80][81][82]
French
From 1941 to 1947,
Fritz Bopp was a staff scientist at the KWIP, and worked with the
Uranverein. In 1944, when most of the KWIP was evacuated to
Hechingen
in Southern Germany due to air raids on Berlin, he went there too, and
he was the Institute's Deputy Director there. When the American
Alsos Mission evacuated Hechingen and
Haigerloch,
near the end of World War II, French armed forces occupied Hechingen.
Bopp did not get along with them and described the initial French policy
objectives towards the KWIP as exploitation, forced evacuation to
France, and seizure of documents and equipment. The French occupation
policy was not qualitatively different from that of the American and
Russian occupation forces, it was just carried out on a smaller scale.
In order to put pressure on Bopp to evacuate the KWIP to France, the
French Naval Commission imprisoned him for five days and threatened him
with further imprisonment if he did not cooperate in the evacuation.
During his imprisonment, the
spectroscopist
Hermann Schüler, who had a better relationship with the French,
persuaded the French to appoint him as Deputy Director of the KWIP. This
incident caused tension between the physicists and spectroscopists at
the KWIP and within its umbrella organization the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft (Kaiser Wilhelm Society).
[83][84][85][86]
Soviet
At the close of World War II, the Soviet Union had special search
teams operating in Austria and Germany, especially in Berlin, to
identify and "requisition" equipment, material, intellectual property,
and personnel useful to the
Soviet atomic bomb project. The exploitation teams were under the
Soviet Alsos and they were headed by
Lavrentij Beria's deputy, Colonel General A. P. Zavenyagin. These teams were composed of scientific staff members, in
NKVD officer's uniforms, from the bomb project's only laboratory, Laboratory No. 2, in Moscow, and included
Yulij Borisovich Khariton,
Isaak Konstantinovich Kikoin, and
Lev Andreevich Artsimovich.
Georgij Nikolaevich Flerov had arrived earlier, although Kikoin did not recall a vanguard group. Targets on the top of their list were the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für Physik (KWIP,
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Physics), the Frederick William University (today, the
University of Berlin), and the
Technische Hochschule Berlin (today, the
Technische Universität Berlin (
Technical University of Berlin).[87][88][89]
German physicists who worked on the
Uranverein and were sent to the
Soviet Union to work on the
Soviet atomic bomb project included: Werner Czulius,
Robert Döpel,
Walter Herrmann,
Heinz Pose,
Ernst Rexer,
Nikolaus Riehl, and
Karl Zimmer.
Günter Wirths, while not a member of the
Uranverein, worked for Riehl at the
Auergesellschaft on reactor-grade uranium production and was also sent to the Soviet Union.
Zimmer's path to work on the Soviet atomic bomb project was through a prisoner of war camp in
Krasnogorsk, as was that of his colleagues
Hans-Joachim Born and
Alexander Catsch from the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für Hirnforschung (KWIH,
Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Brain Research, today the
Max-Planck Institut für Hirnforschung), who worked there for
N. V. Timofeev-Resovskij, director of the
Abteilung für Experimentelle Genetik (Department of Experimental Genetics). All four eventually worked for Riehl in the Soviet Union at
Laboratory B in Sungul'.
[90][91]
Von Ardenne, who had worked on isotope separation for the
Reichspostministerium (Reich Postal Ministry), was also sent to the Soviet Union to work on their atomic bomb project, along with
Gustav Hertz, Nobel laureate and director of Research Laboratory II at
Siemens,
Peter Adolf Thiessen, director of the
Kaiser-Wilhelm Institut für physikalische Chemie und Elektrochemie (KWIPC, Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry and Electrochemisty, today the
Fritz Haber Institute of the Max-Planck Society), and
Max Volmer, director of the Physical Chemistry Institute at the Berlin
Technische Hochschule (
Technical University of Berlin), who all had made a pact that whoever first made contact with the Soviets would speak for the rest.
[92] Before the end of World War II, Thiessen, a member of the
Nazi Party, had Communist contacts.
[93]
On 27 April 1945, Thiessen arrived at von Ardenne's institute in an
armored vehicle with a major of the Soviet Army, who was also a leading
Soviet chemist, and they issued Ardenne a protective letter (
Schutzbrief).
[94]
Comparison of the Manhattan Project and the Uranverein
The joint American, British, and Canadian
Manhattan Project
developed the uranium and plutonium atomic bombs, which helped bring an
end to hostilities with Japan during World War II. Its success is
attributable to meeting all four of the following conditions:
[95]
- A strong initial drive, by a small group of scientists, to launch the project.
- Unconditional government support from a certain point in time.
- Essentially unlimited manpower and industrial resources.
- A concentration of brilliant scientists devoted to the project.
Even with all four of these conditions in place the Manhattan Project
succeeded only after the war in Europe had been brought to a
conclusion. Mutual distrust existed between the German government and
some scientists.
[96][97]
For the Manhattan Project, the second condition was met on 9 October
1941 or shortly thereafter. Germany fell short of what was required to
make an atomic bomb.
[98][99][100][101]
Significant here is that by the end of 1941 it was already apparent
that the German nuclear energy project would not make a decisive
contribution to ending the German war effort in the near term, and
control of the project was relinquished by the
Heereswaffenamt (HWA, Army Ordnance Office) to the
Reichsforschungsrat (RFR, Reich Research Council) in July 1942.
Concerning condition three, the needs in
materiel
and manpower for a large-scale project necessary for the separation of
isotopes for a uranium-based bomb and heavy water production for
reactors for a plutonium-based bomb may have been possible in the early
years of the war.
[citation needed]
As to condition four, the high priority allocated to the
Manhattan Project
allowed for the recruitment and concentration of capable scientists on
the project. In Germany, on the other hand, a great many young
scientists and technicians who would have been of great use to such a
project were conscripted into the German armed forces, while others had
fled the country before the war due to antisemitism and political
persecution.
[102]
Whereas
Enrico Fermi, a scientific
Manhattan leader, had an "
unique double aptitude for theoretical and experimental work" in the 20th century
[103], the successes at Leipzig until 1942 resulted from the cooperation between the theoretical physicist
Werner Heisenberg and the experimentalist
Robert Döpel. Most important was their experimental proof of an effective neutron increase in April 1942.
[104][105]
At the end of July of the same year, the group around Fermi also
succeeded in the neutron increase within a reactor-like arrangement.
In June 1942, Döpels "
Uran-Maschine" was destroyed by a chemical explosion introduced by
hydrogen[106],
which finished the work on this topic at Leipzig. Thereafter, despite
increased expenditures the Berlin groups and their extern branches
didn't succeed in getting a reactor critical until the end of World War
II. However, this was realized by the Fermi group in December 1942, so
that the German advantage was definitively lost, even with respect to
research on energy production.
Recent developments
A book by
Rainer Karlsch,
Hitlers Bombe, published in 2005, alleged that
Diebner's team conducted the first successful nuclear weapon test of some type (employing
hollow charges for ignition) of nuclear-related device in
Ohrdruf, Thuringia on 4 March 1945.
[107] However, Karlsch has been criticized for displaying "a catastrophic lack of understanding of physics" by physicist
Michael Schaaf,
who is himself the author of an earlier book about Nazi atomic
research, while Karlsch himself has acknowledged that he lacked absolute
proof for the claims made in his book.
[108]
A similar project was described in
David Irving's 1967 book
The Virus House,
where it was claimed that some of Diebner's researchers had
unsuccessfully attempted to produce fusion using conventional explosives
and heavy
paraffin
as a deuterium carrier. Irving also describes a further experiment in
1943 carried out by Trinks and Sachsse, which used a hollow sphere of
silver filled with
deuterium, imploded by conventional explosives. Again it was unsuccessful, no trace of radioactivity being produced.
[109]
Science historian Mark Walker also published his analysis in 2005,
[110]
and in 2005 Karlsch and Walker published an article on the
controversial historical evidence, briefly referenced in the article.
[111] The
Physikalisch-Technische Bundesanstalt
(PTB, Federal Physical and Technical Institute) tested soil samples in
the area of the alleged test, and in 2006 it issued its results:
keinen Befund (nothing found).
[112] Karlsch published a follow-on book with Heinko Petermann to elaborate on issues raised in his first book.
[113]